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THE SOBERING TRUTH:  
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CATEGORIZES DRUNK 






Cite as: Jennifer Chow, The Sobering Truth: The Seventh Circuit Categorizes Drunk 






For over the past two decades, Congress has been extending 
federal jurisdiction over crime control to encourage states to work 
more aggressively to attack the problem of violent crimes committed 
by repeat offenders and criminals serving shortened sentences.1 
Congress enacted the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) in 1984 
to promote this important federal sentencing principle of more 
severely punishing violent repeat offenders.2 The ACCA is a recidivist 
statute, or a “three strikes law,” that substantially raises the penalty for 
                                                 
*J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., high honors, Computer Information Systems, DePaul University, 
May 2004. I am deeply indebted to Professor Hal R. Morris for making this 
Comment possible. I would also like to thank my parents and brother for their 
unconditional love and support.  
1 H.R. REP. NO. 105-157; JOANNE O’BRYANT, DOMESTIC SOCIAL POLICY 
DIVISION, ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, CRIME CONTROL: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE, 3 
(2003), http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/society/crime/crimegun1.pdf.  
2 See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990); United States v. 
McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 2006); H.R. Rep. No. 98-1073, at 1 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.N. 3661.  
1
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possession of a firearm if a defendant has three previous convictions 
for a violent felony.3 In the two decades after the ACCA’s enactment, 
the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals consistently interpreted the 
ACCA’s term “violent felony” to encompass intentional violent acts 
that present a serious potential risk of physical injury to others.4 In 
2004, the United States Supreme Court in Leocal v. Ashcroft  held that 
drunk driving offenses are not crimes of violence5 under the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act (“CCCA”), provided that the 
offenses either do not have an intent component or require only a 
showing of negligence.6 Nonetheless, in 2005, the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit misapplied precedent and misinterpreted the 
ACCA’s statutory text by expanding the ACCA’s predicate violent acts 
to include negligent drunk driving.7 
                                                 
3 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); United States v. Caldwell, No. 97-5252, 2000 WL 
331950, at *8 n.3 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000). Along with violent felonies, a serious 
drug offense also qualifies as a predicate act under the ACCA. This Comment, 
however, will focus strictly on violent felony convictions as the case at issue, United 
States v. Sperberg, focuses on a violent felony conviction as predicate act.  
4 See United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (sexual assault); United 
States v. Altsman, 89 Fed. App. Appx. 357 (3d Cir. 2004) (attempted kidnapping); 
United States v. Wardick, 350 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2003) (assault); United States v. 
Matthews, 278 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2002) (reckless aggravated assault); United States 
v. Coles, 97 Fed. Appx. 665 (7th Cir. 2004) (armed robbery); United States v. 
McKinney, 328 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (attempted burglary); United States v. 
Greenberg, 104 Fed. Appx. 34 (9th Cir. 2004) (robbery); United States v. Maddox, 
388 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 2004) (escape); United States v. Lee, 208 F.3d 1306 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (robbery and burglary). This list of cases is not meant to be an exhaustive 
list of violent felonies, but is meant to illustrate the type of intentionally, violent acts 
Courts of Appeals have considered a predicate violent felony under the ACCA.  
5 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Bell, 187 Fed. Appx. 610, 613 (7th 
Cir. 2006), has stated that the terms “crime of violence” and “violent felony” are 
interchangeable. Thus, for the purposes of this Comment, these terms are also 
interchangeable and reference to a statute referring to a “violent felony” or one to a 
“crime of violence” is distinction without a difference.  
6 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).  
7 This Comment focuses on drunk driving offenses that lack injury or death but 
are made felonious by state recidivist laws. Normally, charges of driving under the 
influence which lack any injury or death are misdemeanors, but many states have 
2
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 172
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Sperberg categorized the 
offense of drunk driving as a violent crime thereby qualifying drunk 
driving as a predicate violent felony subject to recidivist sentence 
enhancement under the ACCA.8 In expanding the ACCA’s predicate 
violent acts, the Seventh Circuit relied on its decision in United States 
v. Rutherford where it held that drunk driving is a crime of violence 
under § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 9 The 
court noted that although Rutherford dealt with the Sentencing 
Guidelines, the language of § 4B1.2(a)(2) is identical to that of § 
924(e) of the ACCA, and, thus, there is “no basis for reading the 
provisions differently.”10 Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Leocal that drunk driving is not a crime of violence under the 
CCCA,11 the Seventh Circuit distinguished Sperberg from Leocal 
concluding that the CCCA employed operatively different language.12  
The Seventh Circuit erred in relying on Rutherford and 
categorizing drunk driving as a violent felony under the ACCA.13 In 
light of drunk driving’s non-violent nature, the Seventh Circuit’s 
expansion of the ACCA’s predicate acts blurs the distinction between 
crimes of violence and crimes of neglect and allows excessive 
penalties for crimes that Congress did not intend for heightened 
punishment.14 Part I of this Comment will trace the relevant judicial 
and legislative history necessary to analyze the Sperberg decision. Part 
II will set out the factual background to the issues raised in Sperberg 
and detail the reasoning of the court. Lastly, Part III will discuss why 
Sperberg was incorrectly decided: first, the Seventh Circuit should 
have followed the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Leocal that the 
                                                                                                                   
recidivist statutes, or “three strikes laws,” which make a repeat DUI charge a felony. 
16B David Kramer, Am. Jur. Constitutional Law, § 656 (2d ed. 2006).  
8 United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2005). 
9 United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995). 
10 Sperberg 432 F.3d at 709. 
11 Leocal, 543 U.S. 1.  
12 Sperberg 432 F.3d at 709. 
13 See id.  
14 See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 (referring to the consequences of interpreting § 
16 of the CCCA to include accidental or negligent conduct).  
3
Chow: The Sobering Truth: The Seventh Circuit Categorizes Drunk Driving
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 173
predicate acts under the ACCA should not be enlarged to include 
crimes of neglect; second, the Seventh Circuit should have interpreted 
the ACCA under a ejusdem generis analysis rather than interpreting 
the ACCA’s pertinent clause in isolation; and finally, drunk driving 
should not be considered a violent felony considering Congress’ 




A. The State of the Law Prior to United States v. Sperberg 
 
1. The Armed Career Criminal Act 
 
In 1984, Congress observed that nearly 25 million American 
households, or three out of every ten, were affected by crimes 
involving theft and violence.15 Congress explained that it had become 
apparent that a large number of these crimes were committed by a very 
small number of chronic offenders.16 As a response to protect the 
public from the continuing crimes of these habitual offenders, 
Congress enacted the ACCA to supplement the states’ law 
enforcements efforts against armed “career” criminals whose 
livelihood is “crime for profit.”17 The ACCA raises the penalty for 
possession of a firearm by a felon from a maximum of ten years in 
prison to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of 
life in prison without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence 
allowed, if the defendant has three previous convictions for a violent 
felony or a serious drug offense.18 Section 924(e)(2)(B) of the ACCA 
defined the term “violent felony” to mean: 
 
                                                 
15 H.R. Rep. No. 98-1073, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.N. 3661.  
16 Id. 
17 See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990); Brief of Appellant at 
12, United States v. Ivan Excel Mason, No. 05-3879 (8th Cir. Dec., 2005); H.R. Rep. 
No. 98-1073, at 3.  
18 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); United States v. Caldwell, No. 97-5252, 2000 WL 
331950, at *8 n.3 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000).  
4
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any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year . . . that  
 
(i) has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another; or 
  
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents 
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.19  
 
The Supreme Court has made it easier for courts to determine 
which crimes constitute a “violent felony” by instructing that state 
convictions for the felonies listed in the § 924(e) can be used as 
predicate violent felonies to raise the defendant’s sentence if the court 
finds that the state statute defining the defendant’s prior offenses 
corresponds to the generic meaning of those crimes listed in § 924(e) 
as predicate offenses.20 Determining which crimes fall under the 
“otherwise involves” clause, however, has not been so simple since the 
Supreme Court has left the question solely for its lower courts to 
determine.21     
 
 2. The ACCA and United States v. Doe 
 
Since the ACCA’s enactment, the federal courts of appeals have 
repeatedly been presented with the question of what types of offenses 
                                                 
19 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). The “otherwise involves” 
clause is the operative clause in which this Comment focuses on. 
20 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. State convictions may also be used as predicate 
violent felonies if the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury 
to find all the elements of the generic meaning of the offense to convict the 
defendants.  
21 See Jondavid S. DeLong, What Constitutes “violent felony” for the Purpose 
of Sentence Enhancement Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 
924(e)(1)), 119 A.L.R. FED. 319 (1994).  
5
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constitute violent felonies under the ACCA.22 In 1992, the First Circuit 
in United States v. Doe held that a felon in possession of a firearm is 
not itself a “violent felony” under § 924(e) of the ACCA.23 Writing for 
the court, then Chief Judge Breyer observed that the statute gives 
several specific examples such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of 
explosives and then adds “or otherwise involves conduct that presents 
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” and stated that 
simple possession of a firearm did not fit within the literal language of 
the ACCA.24 Judge Breyer explained that simple firearm possession 
usually does not involve violence, and the same risk of physical harm 
that accompanies burglary or arson cannot easily be imagined to 
accompany conduct that normally constitutes simple firearm 
possession.25 Judge Breyer specifically provided the example of drunk 
driving and explained that Congress did not intend to enhance 
sentences based on such non-violent convictions because § 924(e) of 
the ACCA “calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the 
possibility of more closely related, active violence.”26 Although Judge 
Breyer recognized a strong argument that a previously convicted felon 
who possesses a gun reveals a willingness to break the law again, he 
stressed that the legislature expressed this concern in the context of 
criminalizing the conduct and not on whether the felony was “violent” 
for sentence enhancement purposes.27 Additionally, Judge Breyer 
                                                 
22 See United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (sexual assault); 
United States v. Altsman, 89 Fed. App. Appx. 357 (3d Cir. 2004) (attempted 
kidnapping); United States v. Wardick, 350 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2003) (assault); 
United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2002) (reckless aggravated 
assault); United States v. Coles, 97 Fed. Appx. 665 (7th Cir. 2004) (armed robbery); 
United States v. McKinney, 328 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (attempted burglary); 
United States v. Greenberg, 104 Fed. Appx. 34 (9th Cir. 2004) (robbery); United 
States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 2004) (escape); United States v. Lee, 
208 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2000) (robbery and burglary).  
23 United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1992).  
24 Id. at 224 (emphasis in original) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 225. 
27 Id. at 226.  
6
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noted that there is no legislative evidence that Congress’ use of the 
words “serious potential risk,” instead of the more traditional language 
“substantial risk,”28 was thereby intended to include gun possession 
crimes or drunk driving.29  
 
 3. The United States Sentencing Guidelines  
 
 The concern over the problem of violent crimes committed by 
repeat offenders which prompted Congress to enact the ACCA was the 
same concern which prompted it to enact the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984 (“SRA”).30 While the ACCA’s purpose is mainly to be “tough 
on crime,” however, the SRA was enacted to serve multiple purposes: 
first, ensuring that defendants serve their complete sentences; second, 
establishing a uniform sentencing scheme by narrowing the wide 
disparity in sentences imposed across federal jurisdictions; and third, 
creating a proportional system that “imposes appropriately different 
sentences of criminal conduct of different severity.”31  
As part of the SRA, Congress created the United States 
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), an independent body within 
the judicial branch, and charged it with “establish[ing] sentencing 
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system.”32 
Congress set general goals for federal sentencing and imposed upon 
the Commission a variety of responsibilities.33 Among those 
responsibilities, Congress directed the Commission to establish 
maximum and minimum sentences for certain offenses based on the 
characteristics of a crime.34 The Commission implemented this 
                                                 
28 Id. (referring to the language in 18 U.S.C §§ 16, 3142(f), 3156(a)(4). 
29 United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1992). 
30 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1. 
31 Id.  
32 United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 753 (1997). 
33 Id. 
34 Id.; see Gilles R. Bissonnette, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines After Booker, 52 UCLA. L. REV. 1497, 1506-07 (2006) (citing to 28 
U.S.C. § 944(b)(1) (2000)(“The Commission…shall, for each category of offense 
involving each category of defendant, establish a sentencing range”).  
7
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directive by promulgating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”) in 1987.35 
Like the ACCA, the Guidelines also contain a career offender 
provision which specifies a sentence enhancement for repeat offenders 
who have been convicted of at least three “crimes of violence.”36 
Section 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines defines the term “crime of 
violence” with language precisely identical to that of § 924(e) of the 
ACCA.37 Section 4B1.2 provides that the: 
 
term “crime of violence” means any offense under 
federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, that-- 
 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another, or 
 
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, 
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.38 
 
The language of § 924(e) and the language of § 4B1.2 were not always 
identical, however.39 Initially, the language of § 4B1.2(1)(ii) was 
identical to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) of the CCCA. 40 The change did not 
occur until 1989 when the Sentencing Commission amended 
§4B1.2(1) to language identical to § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) of the 
                                                 
35 See LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 753. 
36 U.S.S.G §4B1.1. 
37 U.S.S.G. §4B1.2. 
38 U.S.S.G. §4B1.2 
39 Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2001).    
 40 18 U.S.C. §16(b) provides that a crime of violence includes “any . . . offense 
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.”  See also Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 608.    
8
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ACCA.41 In amending the original § 4B1.2(1), the Sentencing 
Commission specifically noted that the amendment was not intended 
to change the substance of the guideline, but only to clarify its 
meaning.42 The Commission intended to clarify that courts must be 
guided by actual conduct when determining a “violent felony,” and 
that mere possession of a firearm is not a crime of violence under § 
4B1.2(1)(ii), 43 just as it is not a crime of violence under the ACCA.44  
Unlike the ACCA, however, the Guidelines are advisory and do 
not require a judge to impose mandatory minimum.45 In 2004, the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Booker excised the mandatory 
provisions of the Guidelines and held that although judges must still 
consider the Guidelines, they are not required to follow the Guidelines 
in any particular case.46 In exercising discretion to follow the 
Guidelines, a judge may consider the offense behavior and the 
offender’s characteristics.47 Taking the offense level and criminal 
history category together, the Guidelines specify a recommended 
                                                 
 41 Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) defines “violent felony” as any crime that (i) has 
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, 
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another.  
42 Id. (citing to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 106-07 (1991)). 
43 See Stinson v. U.S., 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993); United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 
40 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1994); United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual,  Chapter 4, Part B (2005), 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.  
44 See United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Doe, 
960 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1992); also United States v. Powell, 813 F. Supp. 903 (Mass. 
Dist. Ct. 1992) (extending the First Circuit’s reasoning in Bell and Doe to the Bail 
Reform Act and holding that felon in possession of a firearm is not a crime of 
violence).  
45 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2004). 
 46 543 U.S. at 259-60; Lucien B. Campbell and Henry J. Bemporad, Office of 
the Federal Public Defender, Western District of Texas, An Introduction to Federal 
Sentencing 2 (2006), http://www.ussc.gov/training/intro9.pdf.  
47 U.S.S.G. § 1A2. 
9
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narrow sentencing range in which a judge should impose a sentence.48 
The Guidelines allow the judge to enhance a recidivist’s sentence 
based on a prior conviction without having it mentioned in the 
indictment or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.49 
Additionally, unlike the ACCA, the Guidelines allow for the 
possibility of supervised release.50 Thus, although the language of the 
ACCA and the Guidelines are identical, the application of the 
Guidelines in determining a sentence in an advisory fashion may 
produce a shorter sentence than the ACCA’s mandatory minimum of 
fifteen years.51 
 
 4. The Guidelines and United States v. Rutherford 
 
Three years after the First Circuit decided Doe, the Seventh 
Circuit in United States v. Rutherford was asked to determine as a 
matter of first impression whether a vehicular assault committed by a 
drunk driver constitutes a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 of the 
Guidelines.52 Answering in the affirmative, the majority53 explained 
that drunk driving poses serious risks to other motorists and 
pedestrians.54 As such, drunk driving satisfied subsection (ii) of § 
4B1.2(a) because the offense “involves conduct that presents a serious 
                                                 
48 See United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005), 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.  
49 Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (specifically exempting a prior conviction from 
impermissible judicial factfinding); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 247 
(1998).  
50 U.S.S.G §4B1.1; see Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 371.  
51 See Oral argument recording. United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 04-
4135. (7th Cir. Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 04-
4135). 
52 Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370. 
53 Id. at 371 (JJ. Cummings and Rovner joining in the majority). 
54 Id. at 376-77. 
10
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potential risk of physical injury to another.”55 The majority noted, 
however, that qualifying felony drunk driving as a crime of violence 
under the “otherwise” clause was “somewhat troubling,” and invited 
the Commission to re-evaluate its definition of crime of violence to 
determine whether drunk driving should qualify as a predicate act of 
crime of violence.56 Judge Easterbrook observed in his concurrence 
that the defendant Rutherford was not charged with drunk driving, but 
rather was charged with a crime of assault57 which resulted from 
driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury to 
another with a motor vehicle.58 Thus, while the majority concluded 
that all drunk driving offenses are crimes of violence, Judge 
Easterbrook suggested that a crime of violence existed in Rutherford’s 
case only because of the presence of first degree assault and injury.59 
But ten years later, Judge Easterbrook referred to his Rutherford 
concurrence saying, “[m]y concurrence is all very nice, but there was a 
reason why I was writing for myself. The decision, of course, is the 
decision of the majority. And there it is.”60  
At the time Rutherford was decided, neither the Seventh Circuit 
nor any other court had determined whether a vehicular assault 
committed by a drunk driver or any other similar offense constitutes a 
crime of violence under § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines.61 Since Rutherford, 
                                                 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 377. 
57 Id. at 378 (J. Easterbrook concurring). Alabama Code § 13A-6-20(a)(5) 
provides that a person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if, while 
driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance or any combination 
thereof in violation of Section 32-A-191 he causes serious bodily injury to the 
person of another with a motor vehicle.  
58 United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1995) (J. Easterbrook 
concurring) (stating that “[d]runk driving is a lesser included offense that [first 
degree assault while driving under the influence] creates”).  
59 See id.  
60 Oral argument recording. United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 04-4135. 
(7th Cir. Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 04-
4135). 
61 Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 375. 
11
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however, the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found 
Rutherford’s reasoning persuasive and have held DUI as a “crime of 
violence” within the meaning of § 4B1.2.62 Each of those circuits 
explicitly referred to Rutherford’s analysis that drunk driving is 
inherently dangerous and, as such, is a violent felony under the 
Guidelines because of its inherent risk of presenting physical injury to 
another.63 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Chauncey 
adopted a line of reasoning similar to that in Judge Easterbrook’s 
Rutherford concurrence and held involuntary manslaughter resulting 
from a DUI as a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2.64 
 
5. The CCCA and Leocal v. Ashcroft  
 
Nine years after Rutherford, in 2004, the federal courts were again 
faced with the question of whether drunk driving constitutes a “crime 
of violence.”65 This time, however, the question arose in the context of 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (“CCCA”).66 The 
CCCA broadly reformed the federal sentencing system by revising bail 
and forfeiture procedures to ensure that criminals serve an appropriate 
amount of time in prison.67 Congress used the term “crime of 
violence” in numerous places throughout the CCCA to define the 
elements of particular offenses.68 Title 16 U.S.C. § 16 of the CCCA 
defines “crime of violence” as: 
                                                 
62 United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Moore, 420 F.3d 
1218 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. McGill, 450 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006). 
63 See DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d at 264; McCall, 439 F.3d at 972; 
Moore, 420 F.3d at 1221; McGill, 450 F.3d at 1281. 
64 See United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2005).  
65 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
66 Id. at 6.  
67 Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-157, at 3 (1997) (stating that the CCCA 
“eliminated parole in the federal criminal justice system and required offenders 
convicted of federal crimes to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences”). 
68 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 6 (providing several examples of how Congress 
employed the term “crime of violence” to define the elements of particular offenses, 
12
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(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person or property of another, or 
 
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its 
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used 
in the course of committing the offense. 
 
 The question of whether drunk driving was a crime of violence 
under this section of the CCCA made its way to the United States 
Supreme Court, which answered in the affirmative.69 The Court in 
Leocal v. Ashcroft  held that drunk driving offenses are not crimes of 
violence under § 16, provided that the offenses either do not include a 
mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence in the 
operation of vehicle.70 The Court focused on § 16’s emphasis on the 
use of physical force, which the court concluded requires active 
employment against the person or property of another.71 The Court 
found that a DUI offense could not include this requisite type of 
physical force because while one may actively employ something in an 
accidental manner, it is much more unusual to say that a person may 
actively employ physical force against another by accident.72 Thus, the 
Court concluded, § 16’s key phrase, “the use . . . of physical force 
against the person or property of another,” suggests a higher degree of 
intent than the negligent or merely accidental conduct found in drunk 
driving.73 
                                                                                                                   
such as: 18 U.S.C. § 1959 which prohibits threats to commit crimes of violence in 
aid of racketeering activity and § 3142(f) which requires a pretrial detention hearing 
for those alleged to have committed a crime of violence).   
69 Id. at 12-13.   
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 9. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 10. 
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 In footnote seven of the Court’s opinion, the Court compared the 
type of conduct referred to § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines to the type of 
conduct in § 16(b) of the CCCA, and observed that § 4B1.2 refers to 
the risk that an accident may occur when an individual drives drunk 
and § 16(b) refers to the risk that a individual may use force against 
another in committing a DUI offense.74 Despite its distinction, 
however, the Court favorably cited Doe later in its opinion by citing to 
Judge Breyer’s observation that drunk driving was not a “violent 
felony” under the ACCA because § 924(e) “calls to mind a tradition of 
crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active 
violence.”75 Referencing Doe with approval, the Court stated that the 
term “crime of violence” combined with § 16’s emphasis on the use of 
physical force “suggests a category of violent, active crimes that 
cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.”76 Thus, drunk 
driving was not a crime of violence under the CCCA  because § 16’s 
language requires a higher mens rea than the merely accidental or 
negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense.77  
Additionally, the Court provided the example Congress’ use of the 
term “crime of violence” in § 101(h) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) to support its holding that drunk driving was 
not a “crime of violence.”78 Under § 101(h), Congress added the term 
“crime of violence” to a list that distinguished drunk driving from 
crimes of violence.79 Section 101(h) defines the term “serious criminal 
offense” to mean: 
 
(1) any felony; 
(2) any crime of violence, as defined in section 16 of 
title 18; or 
                                                 
74 Id. n.7.  
75 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (citing United States v. Doe, 960 
F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
76 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11. 
77 Id. at 10 n.7. 
78 Id. at 12. 
79 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h). 
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(3) any crime of reckless driving or of driving while 
intoxicated under the influence of alcohol or of 
prohibited substances if such crime involves personal 
injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h).80 
 
Because Congress chose to list drunk driving resulting in injury in 
a distinct provision separate from “crimes of violence,” the Court 
explained that interpreting “crime of violence” under § 16 to 
encompass DUI offenses would leave § 101(h)(3) practically devoid 
of significance.81 Thus, the Court concluded, the distinct provision for 
these separate offenses bolsters its conclusion that § 16 does not itself 
encompass DUI offenses.82 
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CATEGORIZES DRUNK DRIVING  
AS A VIOLENT FELONY IN UNITED STATES V. SPERBERG 
 
 In 2005, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Leocal that 
negligent drunk driving offenses are not crimes of violence, the 
Seventh Circuit categorized drunk driving as a violent felony subject 
to recidivist enhancement under the ACCA.83 In United States v. 
Sperberg, the Seventh Circuit expanded the ACCA’s predicate violent 
acts and allowed heightened punishments to be imposed on defendants 
with a criminal history of negligent crimes.84 
 
                                                 
80 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h)) (emphasis in original).  
81 Id. (citing Duncun v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (stating “[a]s we 
must give effect to every word of statute wherever possible...the distinct provision 
for these offenses under § 101(h) bolsters our conclusion that § 16 does not itself 
encompass DUI offenses). 
82 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12. 
83 United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2005). 
84 Id. 
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A. Facts  
 
Roland Sperberg pled guilty to possessing a firearm,85 which 
normally carries a maximum penalty of 10 years of imprisonment.86 
Sperberg was sentenced to 210 months, however, because the district 
judge87 concluded that he had been convicted of at least three other 
“violent felonies” under the ACCA.88 Sperberg had a lengthy criminal 
conviction record and many of his convictions may have qualified as a 
predicate act under the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.”89 The 
district judge specified three in particular, including one for drunk 
driving in Wisconsin.90  
Wisconsin treats operating while under the influence91 (“OWI”) as 
a misdemeanor but elevates the charge to a felony for repeated OWI 
convictions.92 Thus, after seven OWI convictions, Wisconsin elevated 
Sperberg’s eighth OWI conviction to a felony under state law.93 
Sperberg contended that his drunk driving conviction was not a crime 
of violence under the ACCA.94  
 
B. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook stated that Rutherford, 
which held that drunk driving is a “violent felony” under § 4B1.2, was 
                                                 
85 Id. at 707.  
86 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
87 Sperberg was convicted by guilty plea in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Wisconsin, Shabaz, J., of possessing a firearm despite prior 
felony convictions.  See Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706. 
88 Id. at 707. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 707, 709. 
91 WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DRUNK DRIVING LAW 0.08 
(2006), Oct. 3, 2006, 
http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/safety/motorist/drunkdriving/law.htm 
92 Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 708. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 707. 
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controlling.95 The Seventh Circuit noted that although Rutherford dealt 
with the Guidelines, the language and context of § 4B1.2(a) of the 
Guidelines is identical to that of § 924(e) of the ACCA, and, thus, 
there is “no basis for reading the provisions differently.”96 The Seventh 
Circuit also distinguished Sperberg from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Leocal, which held that drunk driving is not a violent felony under § 
16 of the CCCA.97 The Seventh Circuit emphasized the difference in 
statutory language of § 16, which speaks of “using” force whereas § 
924(e) speaks of conduct that “presents” a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.98 The Seventh Circuit explained that the 
Supreme Court thought that to “use” force is to apply it deliberately, 
which excluded the offense of drunk driving because although driving 
is deliberate, the application of force is not.99 By contrast, the Seventh 
Circuit stated, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s “presents” asks about consequences 
rather than whether the offender deliberately applied force.100 Because 
of this difference, the Seventh Circuit found that Rutherford survives 
Leocal as “materially different language justifies a different 
interpretation.”101  
The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that Sperberg’s best 
argument was that Leocal cited Doe with apparent approval, which 
stated that § 924(e) as a whole “calls to mind a tradition of crimes that 
involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence” which 
cannot be said to include drunk driving.102 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit 
mentioned that not all crimes fit Doe’s description of “crime of 
violence,” and the catch-all “otherwise” clause in subsection (ii) “calls 
for risky activity to be classified with more traditional crimes of 
                                                 
95 Id. at 709. 
96 Id. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
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violence.”103 But the court stated that several circuits have decided104 
the question whether drunk driving is a violent felony under § 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and if the Seventh Circuit were to switch sides, “it 
would more likely aggravate than eliminate a conflict.”105 Therefore, 
the court stated, Rutherford stands controlling and shall remain the 
circuit’s position.106 
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN RELYING ON RUTHERFORD 
 
Sperberg incorrectly followed Rutherford’s reasoning in holding 
that drunk driving is a crime of violence under the ACCA: first, 
Rutherford’s holding that drunk driving is crime of violence under § 
4B1.2 of the Guidelines is questionable in light of Leocal; second, the 
offense involved in Sperberg was mere negligent drunk driving while 
the offense involved in Rutherford was vehicular assault with injury 
resulting from drunk driving; and lastly, sentence enhancement under 
the Guidelines is not nearly as severe as it is under the ACCA.107  
Sperberg’s enlarging of the predicate acts under the ACCA raises 
serious concerns of overly severe punishments because it opens the 
                                                 
103 Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 709. 
104 Although the courts are now in agreement, at the time Sperberg was 
decided, the circuits had split as to whether drunk driving was a violent felony for 
purposes of the ACCA. The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Moore, 420 F.3d 1218, 
1224 (10th Cir. 2005) held that drunk driving was a violent felony, and the Eighth 
Circuit in United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 2005) held that it was 
not. Since Sperberg, the Eighth Circuit reheard en banc in United States v. McCall, 
397 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2006) and rejected the analysis in Walker and held that 
drunk driving qualified as a violent felony under § 924(e)(B)(ii).  
105 Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 709. 
106 Id. 
107 See United States v. Leocal, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); United States v. Rutherford, 
54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (2005); Oral 
Argument of Christopher Van Wagner, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Oral 
argument recording. United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 04-4135. (7th Cir. 
Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 04-
4135). 
18
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door to a host of crimes of neglect that were not meant for heightened 
punishment.108 Under Sperberg’s holding, a person may be exposed to 
severe, heightened punishment under the ACCA for negligent drunk 
driving despite the ACCA’s purpose of targeting violent career 
offenders who commit intentional, active crimes for profit.109 Because 
Sperberg raises such serious implications, the Seventh Circuit should 
revisit Sperberg and analyze § 924(e)(B)(2)(ii) of the ACCA by 
following the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Leocal that the predicate 
acts under the ACCA should not be enlarged to include drunk driving 
and other crimes of neglect.110 Moreover, interpreting § 
924(e)(B)(2)(ii)’s “otherwise involves” clause to include only crimes 
similar in nature to the enumerated crimes which precedes it 
demonstrates that negligent crimes do not fit within the meaning of the 
ACCA.111 Finally, tracing the legislative history also reinforces the 
conclusion that the ACCA should not be expanded to include drunk 
driving and other crimes of neglect.112 
 
A. The Predicate Acts under the ACCA in a Post-Leocal World 
 
Sperberg should not have relied on Rutherford in interpreting § 
924(e)(B)(2)(ii) because Rutherford was not decided in a post-Leocal 
world where drunk driving is not considered a crime of violence under 
§ 16(b) of the CCCA.113 Rutherford interpreted § 4B1.2 of the 
Guidelines to include drunk driving as a violent felony, but Rutherford 
was decided nine years before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                 
108 See Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 709. 
109 See H.R. Rep. 98-1073, at 3.  
110 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (citing United States v. Doe, 960 
F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992)).  
111 See Federal Maritime Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 
(1973) (instructing that “catch-all” provisions should be interpreted within the 
categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated within the statute).  
112 See United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J. 
dissenting). 
113 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11. 
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Leocal.114 Post-Leocal, drunk driving would not be considered a 
violent felony under § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines because the 
Commission specially noted that § 4B1.2(a) should still have the same 
substantive meaning as § 16(b) of the CCCA despite its amended 
language identical to the ACCA. 115 Because § 4B1.2(a) in effect has 
the same substantive meaning as § 16(b), interpreting § 4B1.2(a) to 
include drunk driving would thus contravene Leocal’s holding that 
drunk driving is not a “crime of violence” under § 16(b).116 In light of 
Rutherford’s questionable holding, the Sperberg court should not have 
relied on Rutherford but rather should have relied on Leocal’s 
suggestion that Doe should be followed. 117  
Doe correctly held ACCA’s predicate acts should not be enlarged 
to include crimes of neglect that raise only the possibility of violence 
because interpreting otherwise would blur the distinction between the 
violent crimes that Congress sought to distinguish for heightened 
punishment and other crimes. 118 Although Sperberg was correct in 
concluding that the word “presents” in § 924(e)(B)(2)(ii) focuses on 
the consequences of hurting a person, the court’s main inquiry should 
have been whether the conduct by its nature involves a serious 
potential risk of physical harm against others. 119  
Rutherford, for example, correctly observed that subsection (ii) of 
the “crime of violence” definition focuses on the conduct involved in 
the offense, and its sole concern is with the actions of the offender.120 
                                                 
114 See Leocal, 543 U.S. 1; United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
115 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 106-07 (1991) (stating that in 
amending the original § 4B1.2(1), the Sentencing Commission specifically noted 
that the amendment was not intended to change the substance of the guideline, but 
only to clarify its meaning). 
116 Leocal, 543 U.S. 1. 
117 Id. at 11. 
118 Id. (stating interpreting § 16 to include accidental or negligent conduct 
would blur distinction between violent crimes and negligent crimes for purposes of 
sentence enhancement); Doe, 969 F.2d at 225. 
119 See Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 709. 
120 United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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The Rutherford majority, however, failed to distinguish that the 
defendant Rutherford was not charged with drunk driving, but rather 
was charged with a crime of assault resulting from drunk driving and 
causing serious bodily injury to another with a motor vehicle.121 The 
nature of the drunk driving offense in Rutherford includes assault and 
injury, while the type of the drunk driving at issue in Sperberg lacked 
any injury.122 The lesser included offense of mere drunk driving, 
without assault or injury, simply does not involve a serious potential 
risk of physical harm to others that is associated with assault resulting 
from drunk driving.123  
As Doe pointed out, the consequences of physical harm are 
significantly more likely to accompany inherently more dangerous 
crimes, such as burglary or arson, than to accompany accidental or 
negligent crimes such as drunk driving where there is no assault or 
injury.124 Thus, the reckless disregard in § 924(e) relates not the 
general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a 
person’s conduct, but to the serious potential risk that physical harm 
that will result from committing the offense.125  
The Leocal Court provides the classic example of burglary to 
illustrate such a difference: the offense of burglary falls within the 
meaning of “crime of violence” not because the offense can be 
committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be 
injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that a burglar will deliberately use force against a victim and create 
physical harm.126 In contrast, mere drunk driving, without any assault 
or injury, does not have the accompanying serious potential risk that 
physical harm will result.127 Although burglars are inherently more 
dangerous when they violate gun possession laws, “drunk drivers are 
                                                 
121  Id. 
122 Id.; See Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706. 
123 See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992).  
124 Id. at 224-25.  
125 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004). 
126 Id. 
127 Doe, 960 F.3d at 225. 
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not inherently more dangerous to society when they violate gun 
possession laws.”128 As Doe emphasized, there is no reason to believe 
that Congress meant to enhance sentences based on proof of drunk 
driving convictions because the term violent felony “calls to mind a 
tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, 
active violence.”129  
The tension between the Supreme Court’s contrary initial 
observation in footnote seven that the risks associated with the conduct 
in § 16(b) of the CCCA are different from those of § 4B1.2 of the 
Guidelines, and the Court’s later favorable citation to Doe’s 
observation that DUI is not a “crime violence” under § 924(e) of the 
ACCA, “underscores the unsettled nature of whether Congress 
intended to include drunk driving convictions in the category of 
violent felonies as defined in § 924(e).”130 Although Leocal’s 
observation in its footnote seven and its approval of Doe seem 
contradictory, the contradiction can be reconciled if one interprets the 
Court’s distinction of the risks of drunk driving under § 4B1.2 of the 
Guidelines to be referring to risks associated with drunk driving that 
involves assault and injury to another.131 This conclusion is reinforced 
by the Court’s referencing to Doe with approval and its ultimate 
holding that a “crime of violence” requires a higher mental state than 
the merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI 
offense.132 Thus, although the predicate act of drunk driving involving 
assault and injury may “present a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another,” merely accidental or negligent drunk driving does 
not. 133  
Moreover, the Leocal court focused on the conduct that creates a 
“substantial risk” under § 16(b) of the CCCA and found that drunk 
                                                 
128 McCall, 439 F.3d at 974 (Lay, J. dissenting). 
129 See Doe, 960 F.3d at 225. 
130 McCall, 439 F.3d at 982 (Lay, J. dissenting). 
131 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11. 
132 Id.  
133 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
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driving did not carry such a substantial risk.134 Section 924(e) of the 
ACCA, however, focuses on the higher threat of “serious potential 
risk.”135 Used as an adjective, the definition of the term “serious” 
means “dangerous” or “potentially resulting in death or other severe 
consequences” such as serious bodily harm.136 In contrast, 
“substantial,” in tort’s substantial-factor context, refers to the causation 
that exists when one's conduct is an important or significant 
contributor to another’s injuries.137 As drunk driving does not carry a 
“substantial risk” that physical harm will result, it is less likely that 
drunk driving would carry the higher “serious potential risk” that 
physical harm will result.138 Therefore, as Judge Breyer observed in 
Doe, Congress’ use of the words “serious potential risk” instead of the 
more traditional “substantial risk” shows that Congress did not intend 
to include non-violent crimes such as drunk driving within the scope 
of the ACCA.139  
Leocal further points out that INA § 101(h)’s list of “serious 
criminal offenses” includes distinct and separate provisions for a 
“crime of violence” and for driving under the influence.140 The 
structure of INA § 101 demonstrates that Congress distinguished 
drunk driving offenses involving injury from “crimes of violence” and 
knew that drunk driving was separate from and not subsumed within 
the term “crimes of violence.”141 Thus, the structure of INA § 101 
demonstrates that Congress knows how to include drunk driving in a 
separate provision if it intends to qualify drunk driving as a predicate 
act for sentence enhancement under the ACCA.142    
                                                 
134 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.  
135 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
136 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
137 Id. 
138 See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1992). 
139 Id.  
140 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12. 
141 Brief for Petitioner, at 34-36, Josue Leocal v. John D. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 
(2004) (No. 03-583). 
142 See id. 
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However, Judge Easterbrook’s apprehension with aggravating a 
conflict by not finding drunk driving as a crime of violence is 
understandable.143 After all, all of the circuits who have been asked to 
determine whether drunk driving constitutes a crime of violence have 
answered in the affirmative.144 But even if the Supreme Court were to 
agree with the circuits’ holding of drunk driving as crime of violence 
under § 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines, the Seventh Circuit could still find 
that drunk driving is not a crime of violence under § 924(e) of the 
ACCA because these seemingly contradictory holdings can be 
reconciled.145 Although § 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines and § 924(e) of 
the ACCA have identical language, their effects on sentence 
enhancements have drastically different results.146 The ACCA’s 
mandatory fifteen-year minimum imposes a much harsher penalty than 
would likely happen under a judge’s interpretation of the Guidelines 
and application of it an advisory fashion.147  
Under the Guidelines, the sentencing judge would take into 
account a number of factors determined by Congress to be pertinent to 
sentencing for those charged with possession of firearm and who also 
have previous convictions.148 The Guidelines establishes different 
offense levels based on certain characteristics of the offense such as 
whether the gun was a machine gun, whether the defendant committed 
the act after sustaining two previous felony convictions, etc.149 The 
Guidelines then specify a number of points that take into account 
                                                 
143 United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2005); 
144 United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Moore, 420 
F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. McGill, 450 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006). 
145 See Oral Argument of Christopher Van Wagner, Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant, Oral argument recording, United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 04-
4135. (7th Cir. Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 04-
4135). 
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 21A Laura Dietz et. al., Am. Jur. Criminal Law, § 859 (2d ed. 2006). 
149 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). 
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certain characteristics of the defendant’s criminal history background 
and categorizes the points into different criminal history categories.150 
Taking the base offense level and the criminal history category 
together, a judge would impose a sentence within a specified range of 
months.151 Under this framework, a recidivist defendant likely would 
be sentenced to a penalty far less than he would be under the 
ACCA.152  
To illustrate, consider the hypothetical153 of Defendant Drinker:  
 
Defendant Drinker was an alcoholic. Drinker was a 
frequent patron of a bar in Indiana which was across the 
state border and three miles away from his home in 
Illinois. Although Drinker could have easily walked the 
distance, Drinker believed he was able to handle his 
alcohol and stay in control while driving. The area 
between the bar and Drinker’s home was also an area 
known for high incidences of crime, and Drinker 
thought he would be much safer driving rather than 
walking home while inebriated. Between 1988 and 
2000, Drinker was arrested and charged five times for 
driving under the influence. None of Drinker’s DUI 
offenses resulted injuries, deaths, or damage to 
property. After the first two DUI misdemeanor 
convictions, the court raised Drinker’s three subsequent 
DUI offenses to class 4 felonies for which Drinker 
served a total of seven years in prison (three years each 
for two felonies, and one year for the other felony), 90 
days of probation, and paid the court a total of $5,000 
in fines. In 2004, one year after Drinker was released 
                                                 
150 U.S.S.G. at § 4A1.1. 
151 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005), 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf. 
152 See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924. 
153 For a well-articulated hypothetical explaining the mechanics of the 
Guidelines, see Gilles R. Bissonnette, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines After Booker, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1506-07 (2006). 
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from serving his last DUI conviction, Drinker decided 
he would no longer drive but would walk to and from 
his favorite bar. Because the area was unsafe, Drinker 
bought a handgun from a friend who sent it to Illinois 
from Florida. Drinker carried the handgun with him to 
and from the bar every night. One night Drinker was 
arrested and charged with possession of a firearm under 
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Drinker’s only other offenses in 
his criminal history are the two DUI misdemeanors and 
three DUI felonies. Drinker pled guilty hoping to get a 
lenient sentence from the court.  
 
If the judge decided to apply the Guidelines, Drinker would have 
a base offense level of 24 because the Guidelines specify a base level 
of 24 if a defendant committed the offense of possession of a firearm 
“subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of…a crime 
of violence.”154 The Guidelines specify a number of points for certain 
offense behavior: Drinker would have 6 points for the two DUI 
felonies that he served three years each on because the Guidelines 
specify “3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding 
one year and one month.”155 The judge would then add 2 points for the 
DUI felony that he served one year on because the Guidelines specify 
adding “2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least 
sixty days [that have not already been counted].”156 Finally, the 
Guidelines would specify the judge to add 2 more points since Drinker 
was arrested just one year after he was released from serving time on 
his last DUI conviction.157 Drinker would have a total of 10 criminal 
history points putting him in a criminal history category of V.158 For a 
                                                 
154 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(2). 
155 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). 
156 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b). 
157 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). 
158 See United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005), 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.  
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defendant with a base offense level of 24 and a criminal history 
category of V, the judge would impose a sentence between 92-115 
months.159 Thus, under the Guidelines, Drinker would receive a 
sentence between approximately 7.5 years and 9 years.160  
If, on the other hand, Drinker had been charged under the ACCA, 
the judge would be required to impose at least a fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum, or 180 months.161 This is nearly double the 
amount that Drinker would serve under the Guidelines.162 Although § 
4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines and § 924(e) of the ACCA have the same 
identical language, their effects are drastically different as the Drinker 
hypothetical illustrates.163 The Seventh Circuit should distinguish 
drunk driving under § 924(e) of the ACCA from drunk driving under § 
4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines because a crime of violence under the § 
924(e) should encompass only truly violent crimes that deserve such 
severely heightened punishment.164 The difference between § 4B1.2(a) 
and § 924(e) is a crime of violence that considers an advisory 
Guidelines-type enhancement and a crime of violence that mandates a 
more severe ACCA-type enhancement.165 Because the ACCA imposes 
such an excessive penalty, the Seventh Circuit should have 
distinguished Sperberg from Rutherford by concluding that drunk 
                                                 
159 Id.  
160 See United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005), 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf. 
161 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
162 See United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005), 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf. 
163 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005), 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf. 
164 See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992). 
165 See Oral Argument of Christopher Van Wagner, Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant, Oral argument recording, United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 04-
4135. (7th Cir. Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 04-
4135). 
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driving is not the type of conduct that warrants an ACCA-type penalty 
enhancement.166 The Seventh Circuit should reconcile Rutherford in 
limiting the types of drunk driving crimes deserving of heightened 
punishment under the ACCA by adopting Judge Easterbrook’s line of 
reasoning in his Rutherford concurrence and hold that a crime of 
violence exists where there is both assault and injury.167  
 
B. Applying Ejusdem Generis 
  
Despite Leocal’s holding that drunk driving is not a “crime of 
violence,” Sperberg expanded the predicate acts under the ACCA to 
include the drunk driving as a predicate violent crime.168 The effect of 
Sperberg is that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s “otherwise involves” clause has 
been enlarged to include crimes of neglect despite the list of violent, 
active crimes that precedes the clause.169 The term “otherwise,” 
however, is an elastic term,170 and Leocal instructs that when 
interpreting a statute that features an elastic term, the context of the 
term should be construed in light of the terms surrounding it.171 Thus, 
the catch-all “otherwise involves” clause should be construed in light 
of the nature of violent, active crimes because specific statutory 
language should control more general language when there is conflict 
between them.172  
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 See United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1995). 
168 United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2005). 
169 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
170 See United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J. 
dissenting) (citing to WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1984)) 
(observing that “when used as an adverb, ‘otherwise,’ means (1) ‘in a different way 
or manner’; (2) ‘in different circumstances’; and (3) ‘in other respects.’ Depending 
on which definition of "otherwise" one chooses to apply, and which elements of the 
chosen definition one emphasizes, the "otherwise involves" provision can be read to 
support both the "any crimes" and "similar crimes" interpretations. 
171 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). 
172 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 
(2002). 
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The Supreme Court instructs that “catch-all” provisions should be 
interpreted within the categories similar in type to those specifically 
enumerated within the statute.173 When general words follow an 
enumeration of more specific items, the “sensible and long 
established” maxim of ejusdem generis limits the understanding of the 
general words to refer to the items belonging to the same class that is 
defined by the more specific terms in the list.174 The doctrine of 
ejusdem generis does not apply “where there are no specific terms 
followed by general terms,175 where all of the terms in the statute are 
general,176 or where the terms in question are both specific in 
nature.”177 Similarly, the doctrine should not be applied to restrict the 
general terms following a class of particular terms where the particular 
terms exhaust the class.178 
Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) enumerates four specific crimes of 
burglary, arson, extortion, and those involving use of explosives 
followed by the catch-all provision “or otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”179 
The specific crimes do not exhaust the types of “violent felonies” that 
may fall under the catch-all “otherwise involves” provision.180 For 
                                                 
173 Federal Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 (1973). 
174 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 917 (1994); see also Washington State Dep’t 
of Soc. & Health Servs. V. Guardianship Estate of Keffler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003) 
(“Where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general 
words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects 
enumerated by the proceeding specific words”); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train 
Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991); McCall, 439 F.3d at 976 (Lay, J. dissenting). 
175 82 John Bourdeau et al., Corpus Juris Secundum § 329(2006); see also State 
v. Tin Yan, 355 P.2d 25 (1960); Burke v. Sullivan, 265 P.2d 203 (1954); Bergen 
County Bd. Of Taxation v. Borough of Bogota, 250 A.2d 440 (Law Div. 1969).  
176 Bourdeau, supra note 175; see also Accident & Cas. Ins. Co. of Winterthur, 
Switzerland v. Cook, for Use of State, 33 S.E.2d 571 (1932); McNamara v. State, 
181 N.E. 512 (1932). 
177 Bourdeau, supra note 175; see also Slocum v. Dep’t of Soc. Welfare, 580 
A.2d 951 (1990). 
178 Bourdeau, supra note 175. 
179 18 U.S.C § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
180 See id. 
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example, armed robbery may well be a violent crime that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another but armed robbery 
is not included amongst the enumerated specified crimes.181 Analyzing 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) under the principle of ejusdem generis, the “otherwise 
involves” clause should not be read in isolation but should be 
construed to embrace only crimes similar in nature to the enumerated 
violent crimes.182 In light of drunk driving’s non-violent nature, the 
“otherwise involves” clause should not be interpreted to encompass 
drunk driving offenses which are made felonious by state recidivist 
statutes but do not have elements of assault or injury to other 
persons.183 Rather, the “otherwise involves” clause should be read to 
encompass only serious violent crimes that are similar to nature to 
burglary, arson, extortion, and those involving use of explosives.184  
 
C. Congressional Intent in Enacting the ACCA 
 
The legislative history of the ACCA strongly reinforces the 
conclusion that the “otherwise involves” clause should be interpreted 
to include only crimes similar in nature to the enumerated crimes that 
precede it.185 The history of the ACCA reveals that Congress focused 
its efforts on targeting career offenders—those who commit serious 
crimes as a means of livelihood186 and whose occupation solely 
consists of “crime for profit.”187 Interpreting the “otherwise involves” 
clause to include drunk driving and other crimes of neglect would thus 
make little sense, as no one can possibly make a livelihood from 
driving drunk since drunk driving “is not the result of plan, direction, 
                                                 
181 Id.  
182 Guardianship Estate of Keffler, 537 U.S. at 384; United States v. McCall, 
439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J. dissenting). 




186 See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 587-8 (1990). 
187 H.R. Rep. 98-1073.  
30
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 200
or purpose but of recklessness at worst and misfortune at best.”188 
Including drunk driving as predicate violent felony within the ACCA’s 
purview would not only be unusual, but it would open the door to 
permitting severe penalties for negligent crimes that were not meant 
for heightened punishment.189 Because interpreting the “otherwise 
involves” clause in isolation produces an unusual and unjust result, the 
legislative history of the ACCA should be consulted “to verify that 
what seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought 
of.”190 
When Congress enacted the ACCA in 1984, the sentence 
enhancement provision was contained in § 1202 and was targeted at 
convicted felons possessing a firearm who had three previous 
convictions for “robbery or burglary.”191 In 1986, § 1202 was 
recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) by the Firearms Owners’ Protection 
Act, and just five months later, was amended again by the Career 
Criminal Amendments Act of 1986 to its present form.192 The 1986 
amendment expanded the predicate offenses triggering sentence 
enhancement from “burglary or robbery” to “a violent felony or 
serious drug offense.”193  
The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. 
No. 99-849, (“Report”), indicates that during the 1986 debate 
hearings, Congress intended § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) to encompass offenses 
against people and § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) to encompass offenses against 
                                                 
188 United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1995). 
189 See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 190 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (Scalia, J. 
concurring).  
191 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581 (citing to Pub.L. 98-473, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 2185, 
18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III) (repealed in 1986 by Pub.L. 99-308, § 
104(b), 100 Stat. 459). 
192 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581; United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (Lay, J. dissenting). 
193 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581; United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (Lay, J. dissenting). 
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property.194 The Report explains that Congress intended § 
924(e)(2)(B)(i) to include such “felonies involving physical force 
against a person such as murder, rape, assault, robbery, etc.”195 The 
Report further explains that the other major discussion involved which 
offenses against property would qualify as predicate acts under the 
ACCA.196 The Subcommittee agreed to add “State and Federal crimes 
against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives 
and similar crimes as predicate offenses where the conduct involved 
presents a serious risk of injury to a person.”197 Congress’ 
determination that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) should encompass offenses 
directed against property and its reference to “similar crimes” 
indicates that the “otherwise involves” clause was intended to 
encompass crimes similar in nature to the violent, active crimes 
against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes that 
involves the use of explosives—not negligent crimes such as drunk 




Driving under the influence of alcohol is among America’s 
deadliest crimes as alcohol and automobiles can be a lethal 
combination.199 DUI is a nationwide problem and the legislature has 
                                                 
194 See McCall, 439 F.3d at 979 (Lay, J. dissenting) (citing to H.R. Rep. No. 
99-849).  
195 H.R. Rep. No. 99-849. 
196 Id. (emphasis in original). 
197 Id. (emphasis added); Ellen Martin, U.S. DOT Releases 2005 Data on 
Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities; State, National Statistics Underscore Severity of 
Drunk-Driving Problem, NHTSA, September 23, 2006, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov 
(follow “In the News” hyperlink; then follow “U.S. DOT Releases 2005 Data on 
Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities; State, National Statistics Underscore Severity of 
Drunk-Driving Problem” hyperlink).  
198 H.R. Rep. No. 99-849. 
199 Ellen Martin, U.S. DOT Releases 2005 Data on Alcohol-Related Traffic 
Fatalities; State, National Statistics Underscore Severity of Drunk-Driving Problem, 
NHTSA, September 23, 2006, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov (follow “In the News” 
hyperlink; then follow “U.S. DOT Releases 2005 Data on Alcohol-Related Traffic 
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put effort into prohibiting it and imposing appropriate penalties.200 
Drunk driving is with little doubt a very reckless act that poses serious 
risks to other motorists and pedestrians.201 “After all,” the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has said, that is “why it is 
forbidden.”202 But the dangers and seriousness of drunk driving “does 
not warrant [the court’s] shoehorning it into statutory sections where it 
does not fit.”203 Drunk driving simply does not fit within the meaning 
of “violent felony” as defined by the ACCA. Sperberg incorrectly 
relied upon Rutherford, which is questionable in a post-Leocal world. 
The enhancements under the advisory Guidelines are also not nearly as 
severe as the mandatory minimum and maximum set by the ACCA. 
The Seventh Circuit’s expansion of the ACCA’s predicate acts to 
include drunk driving raises serious concerns of opening the door to 
include a host of negligent crimes that were not meant for severely 
heightened punishment. By reading the “otherwise involves” clause in 
isolation and disregarding Congress’ intent in enacting the ACCA, 
Sperberg produces an unusual, and unjust, result of punishing drunk 
drivers under an act targeted at rehabilitating chronic violent offenders 
and protecting the public from those whose occupation is crime for 
profit.  
 
                                                                                                                   
Fatalities; State, National Statistics Underscore Severity of Drunk-Driving Problem” 
hyperlink).  
200 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 13 (2004). 
201 United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005). 
202 Id. 
203 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 13.  
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